주 병 기

Social Choice and Welfare February 2014 ·         Youngsub Chun ,   ·         Inkee Jang ,   ·         Biung-Ghi Ju   Download PDF   (224 KB) View Article Abstract We provide alternative axiomatic characterizations of the extended egalitarian rules (Moreno-Ternero and Roemer, Econometrica 74:1419–1427,   2006 ) in a fixed-population setting of the canonical resource allocation model based on individual capabilities (output functions). Our main axioms are   disability monotonicity   (no reduction in the amount of resources allocated to an agent after she becomes more disabled) and   agreement   (when there is a change in agents’ capabilities or total resources, all agents who remain unchanged should be influenced in the same direction: all unchanged agents get more or all get less or all get the same amount as before). Look   Inside Within this Article 1.       Introduction 2.       Preliminaries 3.       Axioms 4.       Main results 5.       Concluding remarks 6.       References 7.   

The 12th meeting of the Society for Social Choice and Welfare   June 18-21, 2014, Boston College Keynote speakers: Arrow Lecture by Daron Acemoglu (MIT) ,  Condorcet Lecture by Parag Pathak (MIT) , Presidential Address by  Bhaskar Dutta (U. Warwick), Social Choice and Welfare Prize Lectures by Vincent Conitzer (Duke U.) and Tim Roughgarden (Stanford U.) Submissions : from January 1 st till March 1 st , 2014.  The program will be announced by April 1 st , 2014. Program committee: Tommy Andersson (U. Lund), Carmen Bevia (Autonomous U. of Barcelona), Peter Biro (Hungary Academy of Science), Olivier Bochet (NYU Abu Dhabi, University of Bern), Anna Bogomolnaia (U. Glasgow), Felix Brandt (Technical U. Munich), Eric Budish (U. Chicago), Geoffroy de Clippel (Brown U.), Amrita Dhillon (King’s College London), John Duggan (U. Rochester), Marc Fleurbaey (Princeton U.), Takashi Hayashi (U. Glasgow), Nicole Immorlica (Microsoft Research), Biung-Ghi Ju (Seoul Nationa